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This article analyzes the relationship between Indonesian banking competition, concentration,
and systemic risk, using the characteristics of individual banks and state variables as control variables. This article uses the Panzar–Rosse Model and Concentration Ratio to measure banking competition and concentration, while measuring systemic risk by applying CoVaR. The empirical result
shows that concentration and competition increase systemic risk. This means increasing competition
leads banks to take higher risks, and also shows that banks with high market power tend to charge
higher interest rates, thus increasing systemic risk. The Net Interest Margin as a control variable
is statistically significant in competition-systemic risk models as well as in concentration-systemic
risks. These findings support the competition-fragility view that banking system stability is seriously
affected by banking competition level, especially in decreasing net interest margin periods. On an
individual bank level, the competition-systemic risk relationship depends on the bank size and the
interbank deposit ratio, but the capital structure and demand-deposit to total funding ratio are not
significant.
Keywords: Banking competition; Concentration; Fragility; Systemic Risk
JEL classification: G21; L11; L25

Introduction
The US financial crisis in 2007 to 2009,
and the subsequent global crisis, has motivated
scholars to review and scrutinize research on
systemic risk. One debate among academics relates to the effect of banking competition levels
on banking stability, in which systemic risk has
been a particular concern. There are conflicting views on this matter. The traditional view
of competition-fragility argues that banks in a
competitive market are not obtaining sufficient
monopoly rents and thus generate low profits

and lower capital ratios. Alternatively, some
academics hold a view of competition-stability
that posits that in a less competitive banking industry, banks become more aggressive in taking risks. Where specifically big and important
banks are concerned, such scholars assume that
the bank is deemed ‘too big to fail’ and will be
bailed out by the government in the event of financial difficulties (Acharya, 2009; Acharya et
al, 2017; Beck, De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013).
The competition-stability view suggests that
competition leads to greater stability (Beck, De
Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013). In a non-competitive industry, banks whose stronger market
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power tend to set higher loan interest rates –
which may induce adverse selection – are likely
to be less stable; riskier borrowers obtain more
loan allocations than low risk borrowers, who
generally have more diversified sources of financing besides bank loans. Because the majority of loans are allocated to high risk borrowers,
banks are exposed to a greater default of risk
and to lower performance stability. In competitive banking markets, loan interest rates
are lower, and bank size and market power are
similar. This drives banks to be more operationally efficient and more prudent in allocating
loans, resulting in a positive link between bank
competition and stability (Boyd & De Nicoló,
2005). Conversely, competition fragility suggests that excessive competition drives bank
to take more aggressive actions to maintain its
market share and its profitability. Banks reduce
their requirements and prudential measures
taken in allocating loans to borrowers. They
may also jump into new and opaque market
segments, increasing the bank’s average default
rates. A more competitive banking industry also
creates short-term bank-customer relationships,
since customers may easily switch to competing banks. This short-term relationship generates riskier and more expensive bank loan
evaluation and monitoring. Such conflicting
viewpoints have a very serious impact on banking regulations, as to whether they should shift
towards encouraging a more competitive banking environment, or let just a few big banks
dominate the market.
It is widely believed that regulations may induce competition through some measures that
affect industry concentration (Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, & Zhu, 2014; Martinez-Miera & Repullo, 2010). Through the Indonesian Banking
Architecture policy, the Indonesia Financial
Services Authority states that banks in Indonesia need to be consolidated. In this regard, small
banks are encouraged to merge so as to increase
bank stability expectedly. It has been widely
agreed that regulators want to see fewer banks,
but a greater amount of bank assets. However,
some researchers show that concentration is not
always a good indicator of competition levels
(Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Shaffer, 2004). A more
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concentrated industry is not always a more
competitive one, and vice versa. Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) show that competition and concentration may coexist and can simultaneously induce stability or fragility within
the banking industry.
Industry structure is not the most important determinant of industry competition level.
Schmalensee (1982), a proponent of the New
Industrial Organization (NIO), argues that the
behavior of individual firms is an important
factor that should be considered simultaneously with concentration, in order to explain
the industry’s competitive environment. Baumol (1982) and Baumol et al. (1983) propose
a theory of contestability that introduces a variety of non-structural competition indicators for
measuring firms’ competitive behavior.
In Indonesia, the discussion of the relationship between the level of competition and banking stability – specifically systemic risk – has
always been a hot topic. The number of banks
in Indonesia today is considered excessive and
fragile, such that they may threat banking stability across the industry. On the other hand, Indonesia’s banking industry is dominated by just
a few big banks. Such circumstances illustrate
the pertinence of the following empirical study,
which examines the two conflicting views of the
competition-stability relationship and the competition-concentration measurement controversy, using Indonesian banking data. Individual
banks’ systemic risk impact estimations and
time series analyses give a deeper and clearer
understanding of this strand of research, an area
that previous studies have not addressed.
This study analyzes the relationship between
competition, levels of banking concentration in
Indonesia, and systemic risk. In addition, the
study also considers the characteristics that affect the contributions of each bank to systemic
risk as a control variable in the relationship
model. Moreover, macroeconomic variables
are also included as control variables. It is noted that current academic discourse has not yet
determined the best model to measure systemic
risk.
This study uses a robust measurement methodology for systemic risk (CoVaR), concentra-
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tion, and competition levels. The study also
observes the effects of individual banking characteristics that have a significant influence on
the relations hypothesized. Previous research
on banks’ systemic risk in Indonesia use simple
methods to measure systemic risk and competition. Lestari (2014), for example, observes the
effects of several specific banking factors and
macro variables on Indonesia’s systemic risks,
and Lenisastri (2009) focuses on the impact of
foreign banks on the Indonesian banking system’s competition level and stability. Both use
the concentration ratio to measure competition
and Z-score as systemic risk measurement.
In the next section, we give a theoretical
overview of previous studies. The research
methodology is described in the following section, subsequently accompanied by a discussion relating to the level of competition, the
degree of concentration, systemic risk, and the
relationship between these factors. Finally, we
present conclusions of the study.

Literature Review
In a perfect competitive market, all banks
behave as price-takers and have no incentive
to help troubled banks in need of liquidity.
Troubled banks eventually declare bankruptcy,
something that has no significant impact on the
entire industry (Allen & Gale, 2004). In imperfect competitive markets, banks tend to cooperate and help each other to cope with temporary
liquidity shortages. This is generally because
their businesses correlate to some extent, and
defaulted banks can have serious repercussions
for all other banks. Systemic risk tends to be
higher in an imperfect competitive banking industry (Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2009).
On the other hand, Allen and Gale (2004)
show that a concentrated banking system may
tend towards lower systemic risk because having a few large dominant financial institutions
create more stability than many small weak
banks across the industry. Fewer large banks are
easier to monitor, and have enough resources to
develop a more reliable, sophisticated, and supportive internal banking information system,
and to sustain customer loyalty through more
88
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a more complete product and service. They are
also therefore more resilient to economic and
demand shocks. Larger banks are assumed to
enjoy economies of scales and scope so that
they have comparative advantages in creating
new products and services, but can still maintain a favorable level of efficiency and profitability.
At the same time, bank defaults are more
likely to occur in less concentrated banking
systems because there is no powerful bank to
act as a buffer or stabilizer when a smaller bank
suffers asset deterioration as a result of external
macroeconomic and liquidity shocks (Berger,
et al. 2009). However, the alternative competition-stability hypothesis states a contrasting
position: namely, more competitive and/or less
concentrated banking systems are more stable
(Barth et al., 2012). Large banks in a concentrated banking system are more exposed to greater
moral hazards, as they tend to be overconfident
regarding receipt of government guarantees
that encourage risk-taking behavior and fragility. On the other hand, Barth et al (2012) show
that regulators are usually more concerned with
big bank failures (‘Too Big To Fail’) and thus
neglect to establish prudent regulatory settings
for the whole industry.
Some empirical researches have tested concentration, competition, and banking stability
relationships across countries. Yeyati and Micco
(2007) show that in Latin America, commercial
banks have a positive link between bank risk
(as measured by the Z-score) and competition
(as gauged by Panzar and Rosse 1987, H-statistic), whereas the coefficient for bank concentration is not significant. The results of research
conducted by Yeyati and Micco (2007) support
the competition-fragility paradigm. Schaeck
and Cihak (2008) show that banks in ten European countries and in the US have a positive
link between competition level (as measured by
the Boone indicator) and efficiency. They also
find that more concentrated banking markets
are more stable. Schaeck et al. (2009) show that
competition (as measured by the Panzar Rosse
H-statistic) reduces systemic risk, even after
controlling for banking system concentration.
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Table 1. Indonesia Commercial Banks Core Capital
Core Capital
more than Rp 10 Trillion
Rp 1 Trilion -Rp 10 Trillion
Rp 100 Billion - Rp 1 Trillion
Lower than Rp 100 Billion
Total

2010
Number of
Bank
8
40
74
0
122

2011
%
6.56
32.79
60.66
0
100

Number of
Bank
9
44
67
0
120

2012
%
7.5
36.67
55.83
0
100

Number of
Bank
10
49
61
0
120

%
8.34
40.8
50.8
0
100

Source: Bank Indonesia (2012)

Figure 1. Indonesia Commercial Bank Loan, Deposits, and LDR

The Measurement for Banking Competition
Market competition can be classified into
four types: perfect competition, monopoly,
oligopoly, and monopolistic competition. The
measurement method for industry competition
levels can be divided into two major approaches:
Structural Approach. This approach states
that the structure of the market (market concentration) is associated with competition. Bikker
and Haaf (2002) describe the Concentration
Index (Concentration Ratio or CRN) and the
Herfindahl Hirschman Index as two competition structural approach measurements that are
frequently used.
Non-Structural Approach. This approach is
rooted in Industrial Organization Theory. Models using this approach examine competition
and analyze the behavior of the company without using explicit information about the structure of the market. Models included in this approach include:
Markup Test Approach/Conjectural Variations
(CV). This approach constructs a structural
model consisting of the supply and demand
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equation, considering a markup price over marginal cost as a measurement of company market power. The Markup Test approach has two
advantages that explicitly model the demand
conditions, costs, and profit maximization confronted by market participants.
Panzar-Rosse Approach. Panzar and Rosse
(1987) formulate a simple model that measures
the relationship of bank revenue to various input variables. Panzar and Rosse assume that
banks operate on a long-term balance and that
their performance is influenced by the actions
of other banks. The Panzar-Rosse approach
measures competition as a bank marginal cost
sensitivity to bank revenue changes.
Schaffer (2004) summarizes the advantages
and disadvantages of each measurement method. According to Schaffer, owing to its simplicity, the Panzar-Rosse model is more applicable
and thus widely used in empirical studies. The
weakness of this approach, which is relevant
for research on the industry’s competition level, is that it cannot identify extreme competition
levels such as monopsony or a very segmented
market.
Structure and growth in Indonesian commercial banks can be observed in Table 1 and
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Graphic 1. Based on the 2012 Bank Indonesia Report of Banking Supervision, there are
120 conventional commercial banks, 9 Islamic
banks, and 1.653 rural banks. Of 120 commercial banks, only 10 banks hold core capital of
more than 10 trillion rupiahs.
Systemic Risks
The systemic risk measurement methodology consists of two main approaches that can
be described as macroprudential and microprudential. The macroprudential approach sees a
banking system as a portfolio of assets that may
collapse simultaneously owing to high asset
correlation. In the realm of macro-prudential
measures, academics propose various methods
to determine whether a bank may be included as
a Systematically Important Bank (SIB). On the
other hand, microprudential approach stresses
that individual bank’s defaults may impact an
entire banking system.
CoVaR and MES comprise systemic risk
models that are used and espoused by many academics and practitioners. Both methods convey different views on how failures of financial
institutions contribute to systemic risk. Acharya
et al. (2010) explain that the MES defines the
systemic risk contribution of a financial institution as the average stock return of each institution when the whole financial system is in trouble (i.e. when the market experiences 5% worst
days). Instead of stock return, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) define CoVaR as the value at
risk (VaR) of the financial system, conditional
on an institution’s VaR. Systemically important
financial institutions are financial institutions
that have a significant effect on financial systemic risk when institutions experience financial distress, entailing banks to run and disrupt
financial systems as a whole.
This study uses the CoVaR approach to measure systemic risk and to test the relationship
between the level of banking competition and
systemic risk at bank level. In addition, CoVaR
uses banks’ financial statements and stock returns, both of which are available and relatively
easy to work with, compared with methods that
use credit default spreads that are difficult to es-
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timate and require cumbersome procedures and
model owing to unavailable data.
Competition and Systemic Risks
There are conflicting views about the influence of banking competition on banking stability. In the traditional view, which bases its argument on the competition-fragility proposition,
Keeley (1990) argues the banks in a competitive market are not able to get sufficient monopoly rents. As such, they generate low profits and
low capital ratios. Consequently, banks became
more aggressive in taking risks and are more
vulnerable to economic shock. In line with
this argument, Hellman et al. (2000) find that
more concentrated banking sectors are more
stable because the banks reduce their risks and
enjoy monopoly profits (concentration stability). Studies conducted recently by Llewellyn
(2007), Brunnermeier (2009), and Milne (2009)
show that excessive deregulation and competition were both significant factors in causing the
financial crisis in the US and UK.
Contrastingly, instead of competition-fragility, some academics view the competition-stability argument as aligning more to the reality
of the industry. A less competitive banking industry make banks become more aggressive in
taking risks, because banks assume they will be
bailed out by the government in the event of financial difficulties. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)
state that banks with substantial market power
tend to charge higher interest rates so that the
debtors’ risk of defaulting is higher. In the more
competitive banking industry, the interest rate
will be lower so that banks are more stable.
Anginer et al. (2014) have produced research
based on data from 63 from 1997 to 2009 that
align with this argument. The authors conclude
that competition encourages banks to diversify
risk so that they become more stable. In addition, regulatory and institutional frameworks
also play an important role in stabilizing the
banking system.
Fu, Lin, and Molyneux (2014) examine the
effects of banking competition on financial stability in 14 Asia Pacific countries from 2003 to
2010. They observe the effect of competition,
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concentration, regulation, and national banking institutions on the fragility of the banking
system. Their findings also align with the competition-stability hypothesis. Fu et al. (2014)
conclude that competition and lower market
powers drive more prudent risk-taking behavior
among banks, after controlling for macro variables, bank-specific characteristics, and the regulatory and institutional framework. In terms
of regulations and institutions, higher entry
restrictions are generally beneficial to banking
stability. The wider deposit insurance scheme
also increases banking fragility.
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), in explaining this contradiction, argue that the relationship of competition and financial stability
is U-shaped (non-linear). Competition encourages lower interest rates so that the risks of
debtors are smaller and banks are more stable.
However, lower interest rates also reduce bank
income from current loans (performing loans)
so the given bank is more vulnerable to shock.
This causes the results of statistical tests on the
relationship between competition and stability
of the banking system to be conflicting. The results of empirical tests by Jimenez, Lopez, and
Saurina (2013) within Spanish bank data reinforce this U-shaped relationship.
Bretschger et al. (2012) examine the effects
of profitability on the relationship between
banking competition and stability. The authors
examine data from 160 countries from 1970 to
2009. Their results support the competitionstability view. Bretschger et al. (2012) also
conclude that market concentration does not
affect systemic risk directly, but instead opens
opportunities for banks which have strong market power to reach higher profitability levels,
subsequently affecting bank risk-taking and
stability.

Research Methods
The Relationship Between the Level of Banking Competition, Banking Industry Concentration, and Systemic Risks
The Relationship Between the Level of
Banking Competition, Banking Industry Conhttps://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol9/iss2/3
DOI: 10.21002/icmr.v9i2.7138

centration and Systemic Risks is modeled with
the panel data regression equation below:
Riskijt = β0+β1Competitionijt+ϕBankijt+γMarketijt
+αi+λt+εijt
(1)
		
where Risk is systematic risk, Bank is specific bank characteristics as control variables, and
Market are market condition as state variables.
The Specific Bank variables are Size, Net Interest Margin, capital structure (capital to total assets ratio), profitability (ROA), and bank capital structure that is Demand Deposit to Capital
ratio (DDC) and inter-bank loans (BDEP). The
economy state variable is monthly BI Rate.
Banking Competition and Concentration
Banking concentration is measured using a
structural approach comprising CR5 concentration index (concentration of 5 largest banks).
This method is chosen owing to its simplicity
and intuition. The concentration ratio is calculated using the following equation model:
(2)
CR is the ratio of Concentration Index, si is
the market share, k is the number of banks in
the calculation.
To measure banking competition we use the
Panzar-Rosse model. The model follows Bikker & Haaf (2002):
ln INTR = α+(β ln AFR+γ ln PPE+δ ln PCE)
		+ξ ln B+η ln OI+e
(3)
where INTR is the ratio of interest income to
total asset in the quarter t, AFR (Average Funding Rate) is the ratio of interest expense to total funds, PPE (Price Personnel Expense) is the
ratio personnel expense to total balance sheet.
PCE (Price Capital Expenditure) is the ratio of
physical CAPEX and other expense to fixed
assets, BSF is a bank exogenous factor, which
describes the risks, costs, size, and structure of
the bank, which affects the function of marginal
revenue and costs. As a proxy of risk components, this study uses the ratio of capital to to91
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tal assets (EQ), the ratio of loans to total assets
(LO), the ratio of loan to deposit ratio (LDR),
and the ratio of loss provisions to loans (LLP).
As a proxy of deposit structure, the ratio of demand deposits to total bank funding (DDC) is
used to capture the differences in the structure
of deposits. For bank size measures, the log of
total assets (SIZE) is used. OI as Other Income
is the ratio of other income to the total balance
sheet at quarter t, and e is the error term.
The level of competition is measured by
calculating the H statistic per month through a
rolling sample of 12 months, with H = β + γ +
δ. Bank competition level is classified based on
the results of the H statistic where H ≤ 0 means
a market is monopoly, oligopoly with perfect
collusion or short term conjectural variation oligopoly, 0 < H ≤ 1 means a monopolistic competition, and H = 1 is for perfect competition.
We also conducted a test over the long run
equilibrium, as a prerequisite of the Panzar–
Rosse model that Matthews, Murinde, and
Zhao (2007) assert. There is a long-term equilibrium if the profits of a bank are not related
to the input factor (the sum of the input factor
coefficients equal to zero), which is estimated
by the following models:
ln ROA = α+(β ln AFR+γ ln PPE+δ ln PCE)
		+ξ ln BSF+η ln OI+e
(4)
If E=β+γ+δ=0, then there is strong indication of
long run equilibrium, while if E<0 , a disequilibrium is indicated.

Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) work with
the stock return of financial institutions i (Rit)
model with the following equation:

(5)
is the total equity market value of
where
is bank leverfinancial institutions i and
age based on the ratio of total assets to equity
book value.
and
To capture the time varying on
, Adrian and Brunnermeier run two
quantile regressions, of which the first equation
as dependent
is the individual bank return,
variable and economy state variable M as an independent variable, and the second equation is
as dependent
the banking system return,
and economy state variable as
variable and
is the average
the independent variable.
stock return of all existing financial institutions
in a system.
The two equations are:
(6)
= αsystem|i+βsystem|i +γsystem|iMt-1+

(7)

After obtaining quantile regression parameters from the two above equations, the predicted value of VaR and CoVaR are calculated by:
(8)

Systemic Risks
The measurement of individual bank contributions to systemic risk using ΔCoVaR and CoVAR is estimated using Quantile Regression,
following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). The
method is chosen because it does not require
assumptions around the distribution of existing
errors, and is more appropriate for the limited
amount of Indonesian banking data available.
The time series model such as MGARCH/
GARCH requires some assumptions about error distribution and data frequency. The use of
Quantile Regression follows Koenker (2005).
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(9)
An individual bank’s contribution to systemic risk, ΔCoVarit for each institution can be
calculated using this equation:
(10)
(11)
As a state variable, referring to Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011), lagged one period in-
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Figure 2. Graph of The Level of Banking Concentration Trends

Table 2. Commercial Banks Competition with Dynamic Application Model
Variable
Α
LOG(AFR)
LOG(PCE)
LOG(PPE)
LOG(LO)
LOG(OI_)
LOG(LDR)
LOG(LLP)
LOG(EQ_)
SIZE
LOG(BIRATE)
LOG(INF)
LOG(INTR(-1))

Coefficient
0.788236
0.403122
0.127756
0.314881
0.529961
-0.138324
-0.484569
0.027159
0.689035
0.014123
0.258739
-0.071242
0.102885
Adjusted R-squared
Prob(F-statistic)
Akaike info criterion
Durbin-Watson stat

Standard Error
(0.044005)
(0.003627)
(0.002694)
(0.003570)
(0.008617)
(0.018562)
(0.008489)
(0.002586)
(0.023723)
(0.001436)
(0.017107)
(0.008000)
(0.003123)
0.900857
0.000000
0.066579
0.490321

P-Stat
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

dexed stock Return, BI Rate return, and JIBOR
return are included as control variables. We also
include Average Monthly USD-IDR Exchange
rate and Exchange Rate Volatility to control
for the influence of foreign capital on the stock
market.

We observe just 16 banks as sample data because CoVaR method relies on the bank market
value information for the long-observed sample
period. Total assets of these 16 listed commercial banks comprise 70% of Indonesia’s total
banking assets.

Data

Result and Discussions

We use monthly financial reports of commercial banks from Bank Indonesia, and market value of bank shares from Reuters. We
measure the level of banking competition of all
commercial banks from 2003 to 2013. Total assets of all listed commercial banks used in this
study cover 95% of the total banking industry
assets, so that the value of H statistics obtained
is fairly robust.
Systemic risk is estimated for just 16 of the
33 Indonesian listed banks from 2004 to 2013.

Indonesian Banking Concentration

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol9/iss2/3
DOI: 10.21002/icmr.v9i2.7138

Figure 2 shows a decline in the level of banking concentration (CR5) from 0.6 to 0.5 during
the period 200 to 2005. After this period, the
level of banking concentration fluctuates in a
range slightly above 0.5. The Merger of Bank
Niaga and Bank Lippo into CIMB Niaga in December 2009 changes the composition of the
five largest banks but does not alter the level of
banking concentration.
93
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Figure 3. Monthly Banking Competition Dynamics in Indonesia

Table 3. Summary of VaR Statistic Values
VAR_
PUNDI

VAR_
VAR_
AGRAHA BVIC

VAR_
MNC

VAR_
BNGA

VAR_
MEGA

VAR_
NISP

VAR_
PRMT

VAR_
PNBN

VAR_
BNII

VAR_
BBNI

VAR_
BMRI

VAR_
BDMN

VAR_
BBRI

VAR_
BBCA

VAR_
QNB

VAR_
SYSTEM

Mean

-0.3245

-0.2041

-0.2028

-0.1861

-0.1469

-0.1440

-0.1363

-0.1336

-0.1191

-0.1077

-0.1032

-0.0969

-0.0851

-0.0811

-0.0627

-0.0557

-0.0586

Median

-0.2713

-0.2207

-0.1980

-0.1775

-0.1468

-0.1357

-0.1428

-0.1385

-0.1077

-0.1089

-0.0984

-0.0855

-0.0767

-0.0818

-0.0633

-0.0580

-0.0542

Max

-0.0880

0.0597

-0.0447

-0.0584

-0.0295

0.0399

0.0161

-0.0356

0.0097

-0.0220

0.0546

-0.0067

-0.0367

-0.0361

0.0367

0.0043

0.1166

Min

-1.6975

-0.3637

-0.4712

-0.6172

-0.2116

-0.2647

-0.3512

-0.1957

-0.3653

-0.2405

-0.4059

-0.5390

-0.3953

-0.1731

-0.1096

-0.0833

-0.3890

St. Dev

0.1942

0.0809

0.0661

0.0495 0.05573

0.0247

0.0634

0.0270

Skew

-3.6782

0.7891

-1.5558

-0.5178 0.93536

-0.9589

-0.4469

Kurtosis

24.399

4.2303

0.0762 0.03414
-2.4076

1.0642

0.5451

7.5149 12.9557

5.4523

5.4220

-3.4377

0.0477 0.01483
-3.8625

-1.7871

0.0163 0.01510 0.06768
1.8733

1.6091

-1.0657

6.1278 5.80355 5.17246 8.46138 9.74600 22.3125 23.1870 15.9421 14.9021 6.94589 7.34197

Indonesian Banking Industry Competition
As a prerequisite of the Panzar–Rosse model,
the long-term equilibrium test is conducted by
estimating model (4). Given ROA as dependent
variables, we conducted a dynamic treatment
model by adding a lagged variable of ROA (-1)
as the independent variable (referring to Brooks
(2008)). Wald test results with F-statistic tests
on the data panel to value E = 0 (F (1.13909) =
10.22896) indicate that there is long-run equilibrium and that the Panzar-Rosse model is applicable.
The value of the Durbin-Watson statistic,
which is quite small, indicates an autocorrelation (see Table 2). Brooks (2009) states that
autocorrelation may occur in cross-sectional
data such as ours owing to the regional dimension, which is not considered in the model. This
problem usually occurs in analyzing US banking data that has significant differences among
banks operating in different regions in the US.
We continue using the Panzar-Rosse model
since our sample covers all commercial banks
in Indonesia, so there is no regional dimension
problem in our data.
The estimated H-statistic (Panzar-Statistics)
indicates the level of banking competition is
0.845759, conveying monopolistic competi94
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2017

0.0570 0.06418
-1.3576

tion. Banks have enough market power to set
prices (interest rate), although pricing strategies still consider other banks’ strategies operating in the same geographical area or engaging
in similar products. This competition mode is
characterized by free entry and exit in the long
term. Because there are many competitors, collusion – as in the case of oligopoly – does not
occur. The calculation of the level of bank competition within a 12-month rolling sample can
be seen in Figure 3.
In general, the level of bank competition
fluctuated in the range of 0.9 to 0.8. It decreased
in 2006 following a decreased BI Rate from
8.25% in July 2005 to 12.75% in December
2005. Contrastingly, arising BI Rate in 2008
lowered banking competition.
Indonesian Banking Industry Systemic Risk
Individual banks’ Value at Risk is presented
in Table 3 and Figure 4.
Pundi Bank and Bank Artha Graha are banks
with the highest VaR5% volatility. Pundi Bank
has the lowest VaR value of -169%, while Bank
Artha Graha has a VaR value of -36%. Based
on the Pundi Bank VaR chart, we can categorize
this bank as having a serious impact on Indonesian systemic risk, as perceived in the propaga-
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Figure 4. Graph of Banking Value at Risk

tion of the VaR financial system. Other banks
that have similar patterns were BVIC (Bank
Victoria) and MNC banks, albeit with a smaller
magnitude.
The average value of VaR system (-0058)
was very small compared to all individual
banks’ VaR. The highest VaR system was -0.38,
occurring in the global financial crisis of 2008.
There were high VaR system fluctuations from
2008 to 2009 because of oscillating banking
stock prices. Investors sold stock owing to the
panic triggered by the 2008 global crisis, but
they re-entered the market when it became clear
that Indonesian banks were not significantly affected.
Table 4 summarizes the calculation of the
statistical value on the bank contribution to the
systemic risk (ΔCoVaR).
There are differences in the banks’ rating
composition in terms of ΔCoVaR (banks’ con-

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol9/iss2/3
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tribution to systemic risk) and VaR. Bank Pundi and Bank Artha Graha, both having the highest VaR, only contribute -0.2% and -0.062% to
systemic risk, respectively. Other small banks
like Bank QNB Kesawan hardly contribute to
systemic risk, on average.
On the other hand, large banks’ systemic
risk contribution were quite substantial. Nonetheless, contributions to systemic risk were not
perfectly correlated to bank size. For example,
Bank Niaga and Bank BNI, both of which have
greater assets, contribute to systemic risk at a
level that is far below Bank Permata’s contribution.
Based on our estimation, BCA had the highest average value of ΔCoVaR (6.7%). In this regard, BCA was the most systemically important
bank. Bank Mandiri, the largest bank during
the observation period, had an average value
ΔCoVaR that was 5.8% below BCA’s contribu-
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Figure 5. Individual Banks’ Contribution to Systemic Risk (ΔCoVaR)

Table 4. Summary of ΔcoVaR Statistical Values
DCOVAR_BBCA
DCOVAR_BMRI
DCOVAR_PERMATA
DCOVAR_BBRI
DCOVAR_BDMN
DCOVAR_BNGA
DCOVAR_BBNI
DCOVAR_BVIC
DCOVAR_BNII
DCOVAR_NISP
DCOVAR_PNBN
DCOVAR_MNC
DCOVAR_MEGA
DCOVAR_PUNDI
DCOVAR_AGRAHA
DCOVAR_QNB

Mean
-0.067000
-0.058540
-0.048740
-0.043270
-0.035760
-0.035040
-0.028750
-0.027300
-0.017110
-0.016040
-0.015990
-0.011590
-0.009230
-0.002550
-0.000620
0.004144

Median
-0.067750
-0.052430
-0.049960
-0.043450
-0.033520
-0.035020
-0.028780
-0.026130
-0.017580
-0.016600
-0.015020
-0.011190
-0.009010
-0.002180
-0.000670
0.004223

Maximum
0.001695
-0.012200
0.011322
-0.014580
0.011375
0.008476
-0.008780
-0.011800
-0.007770
0.002838
-0.004510
0.000463
-0.001290
0.000138
0.000466
0.008009

tion. However, Bank Mandiri had the highest
ΔcoVaR volatility. Bank Mandiri’s highest systemic risk contribution was amounted to -26%
in October 2008 and -17% in October 2005.
High Bank Mandiri’s CoVaR volatility indicates that bank assets are an important factor
in individual banks’ contributions to systemic
risk.
From our research, it also became clear that
ΔCoVaR has a seasonal pattern. ΔCoVaR tends
to fluctuate in the last quarter of the year when
credit markets have a higher level of competition and high level of loan disbursement.
The Effect of Concentration and Competition on Banking Systemic Risks
Table 5 shows that Competition is statistically significant and has the opposite effect on systemic risk. This indicates that bank competition
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Minimum
-0.10434
-0.26083
-0.08348
-0.07055
-0.11838
-0.05920
-0.06368
-0.05613
-0.03455
-0.03422
-0.04619
-0.03384
-0.01574
-0.01263
-0.00125
-0.00214

Std. Dev.
0.015093
0.032389
0.013253
0.008383
0.015638
0.012189
0.006249
0.006538
0.003783
0.005497
0.006401
0.004303
0.002335
0.001506
0.000305
0.001531

Skewness
1.990818
-2.917350
1.748079
0.668572
-1.026370
1.070389
-1.061130
-1.388180
-0.468870
0.242272
-1.540140
-1.210200
0.437726
-3.147610
1.109724
-1.592950

Kurtosis
10.286070
16.782210
9.612942
5.975632
9.698079
5.407765
11.685840
6.918478
6.446871
5.153187
7.586560
9.219121
4.365849
20.107320
5.161930
8.405935

increases systemic risk (competition-fragility).
The study also shows that the Net Interest Margin (NIM) significantly increases systemic risk.
The significance of Net Interest Margin’s effects on systemic risk in Indonesian banking
is a result of types of bank competition. Since
they operate in a monopolistic banking competition structure, each bank has the market power
to set price. Owing to its strong position in the
market, banks tend to maximize their profits
while simultaneously taking higher risks by increasing the Net Interest Margin (NIM). Higher
loan interest rates increase the average default
risk of a bank’s loan portfolio, threatening bank
stability and increasing systemic risk.
The study’s results also find that changes in
BI Rate have a significant, positive relationship
to systemic risk. Higher market interest rates
drive higher systemic risk. Higher interest rates
increase debtors’ default probability, bringing
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Table 5. The Effect of Competition on Systemic Risks
Variable
α
COMPETITION(-1)
RBIRATE_
SIZE(-1)
NIM(-1)
EQ(-1)
DDC(-1)
COVAR(-1)

Coefficient
0.133284
-0.050695
-0.037573
-0.005132
-0.042488
0.003376
0.006877
0.434432
Adjusted R-squared
Prob(F-statistic)
    Akaike info criterion
Durbin-Watson stat

Standard Error
(0.014483)
(0.013715)
(0.019274)
(0.000376)
(0.017498)
(0.010836)
(0.003684)
(0.020795)
0.494779
0.000000
-4.825442
2.153634

P-Stat
0.0000
0.0013
0.0273
0.0000
0.0153
0.7554
0.0923
0.0000

Table 6. Banking Industry Concentration and Systemic Risks
Variable
α
CR5ASSET(-1)
RBIRATE_1
SIZE(-1)
NIM(-1)
EQ(-1)
DDC(-1)
COVAR(-1)

Coefficient
0.146327
-0.105106
-0.068563
-0.005363
-0.029534
0.006611
0.005449
0.423501
Adjusted R-squared
Prob(F-statistic)
    Akaike info criterion
Durbin-Watson stat

about more non-performing loans, lower bank
stability, and higher systemic risk.
The effect of bank size on systemic risk is also
positively significant. We can thus conclude that
the risk-taking behavior of large banks is an important factor in generating systemic risk. However, banks’ equity is not significant, which is
an indication that banks’ risk-taking behavior is
not directly affected by banks’ equity. Instead,
banks’ funding structures are more important to
the risk-taking behaviors that they demonstrate.
The amount of short term funding (DDC) in a
bank’s funding structure has a significant effect
on systemic risk, although it is not excessive.
We also compare the effects of competition
and concentration by estimating similar models
but substituting competition with concentration. Table 6 illustrates the effect of banking
concentration on systemic risk contribution.
Table 6 shows that banking concentration
has a significant effect on systemic risk (concentration-fragility). Bank concentration shows
a high significance, as a variable. All other
variables in the model have similar significance
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DOI: 10.21002/icmr.v9i2.7138

Standard Error
0.016705
0.027673
0.017435
0.000374
0.017433
0.010634
0.003631
0.020409
0.513085
0.000000
-4.861762
2.148583

P-Stat
0.0000
0.0002
0.0001
0.0000
0.0904
0.5343
0.1336
0.0000

level, except DDC (bank’s funding structure)
By substituting competition with concentration as an explanatory variable, it can be
seen that Net Interest Margin – which is still
a significant variable – is an influential factor
to systemic risk. This indicates that both competition and concentration increases systemic
risk through the Net Interest Margin (NIM),
though concentration has a higher magnitude of
regression coefficient in the last model. The results relating to the effects of concentration on
increasing systemic risk aligns with empirical
studies into the effects of concentration levels
on the Z-score in the banking system (Brestchger et al.2012). These findings are also consistent with Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), who state
that the major banks with substantial market
power tend to charge a higher interest rate to
debtors, thus making them more susceptible to
external shock and default threats.
The relationship between banks’ funding
structures (DDC) and systemic risk is not statistically significant if we include concentration,
rather than competition, as an explanatory vari-
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able of systemic risk. Banking industry concentration already reflects banks’ funding structure
strategies.

Conclusions
Our empirical test indicates that competition in Indonesia’s banking market mimics a
landscape of monopolistic competition, even
though concentration of the five largest banks is
quite high, in the range of 60-50%. Each bank
has enough market power to set prices, because
of their strong position in the market segment,
either through product and service superiority,
differentiation, location advantage, etc.
Banks with the highest level of systemic risk
contribution (ΔCoVaR) are BCA, Bank Mandiri, Bank Permata, Bank BRI and Bank Danamon, subsequently. All these banks’ contributions to Indonesia’s systemic risk is equivalent
to about 25% of systemic risk.
We also find that the level of competition
and banking industry concentration significantly affects the banks’ systemic risk (COVAR).
These findings support the hypothesis of competition and concentration fragility. The effect of concentration on systemic risk is much
higher than the effect of competition. Specific
bank characteristics, including bank asset size,

net interest margin, and bank funding structure,
all have significant effects as control variables.
However, the effects of funding structure disappear if we substitute competition with banking
industry concentration. Concentration already
reflects bank funding structure and dominates
effects on systemic risk.
The highly significant net interest margin effect on systemic risk supports previous studies
that find that increasing competition encourages banks to take higher risks. High levels of
concentration and monopolistic competition
also encourage banks with substantial market
power to charge higher interest that increases
the systemic risk of the entire financial system. The simultaneous effect of concentration,
competition, and NIM indicate that concentration and competition both affect systemic risk
through NIM.
Regulators should consider that increasing
banking concentration – through consolidating the government bank, for example – will
increase systemic risk. This policy will increase
bank market power in charging higher interest rates and reach higher Net Interest Margin.
Our empirical result shows that NIM play an
important and effective channel of competition
and concentration in boosting systemic risk.
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